Shocking Details of the Google-Apple Deal: Is Your Privacy at Risk? Find Out Now!

Apple Inc.’s recent announcement of a collaboration with Google LLC, using the Gemini model as the foundation for Apple Intelligence—including Siri—brings to mind earlier strategic alignments that have raised eyebrows over competition and market dominance. This partnership mirrors a significant move from 2016, when Google became the default search engine on Apple devices through the Google–Apple Internet Services Agreement (ISA). While users technically had the freedom to select alternative search engines or download different browsers, in practice, few did. A federal judge concluded in 2024 that such distribution agreements were anticompetitive, as their default status created significant barriers for competitor access.

The new Gemini deal appears poised to recreate that same dynamic, positioning Gemini at pivotal access points within the Apple ecosystem, such as Siri. Although initial reports indicate that this agreement is non-exclusive—allowing Apple the potential to explore partnerships with other AI models and users the ability to download competing chatbots or browsers—the fundamental lesson from the Google search case is clear: in the digital marketplace, defaults hold significant sway, often more so than formal exclusivity.

Once established, defaults tend to be remarkably persistent. Evidence from the previous Google case revealed that even when Microsoft Corp. offered Apple 100% of Bing’s search revenue, Apple ultimately decided that no price was sufficient to warrant a switch from Google. Judge Amit Mehta’s ruling emphasized that a contract need not eliminate all alternatives to be deemed exclusive in effect; it suffices if it closes off a substantial share of distribution opportunities. Thus, the Apple–Gemini partnership risks creating a similar dynamic in AI distribution.

Furthermore, the potential implications of being the foundational model for Apple's ecosystem could surpass those of being the default search engine. Unlike changing a search engine—which users can at least attempt—it's unclear how easily users might be able to alter the underlying model that drives Apple's Intelligence features. Such a process could involve even more friction than switching search engines.

There are distinctions between the ISA and the current Apple–Gemini arrangement. For instance, while Safari served as a crucial entry point to the internet, Siri and other Apple Intelligence functions do not yet dominate AI-assisted inquiries; most users still access AI tools via standalone applications or browsers. However, as AI chatbots and agents evolve and become more commonplace, the importance of voice assistants and operating system-level AI features is likely to rise. As long as users remain tethered to iPhones and MacBooks, the foundation model that powers Apple's ecosystem will enjoy a substantial distribution advantage. Even if consumer behavior shifts toward chatbots overtaking search engines as primary access points to information, the prevailing hardware ecosystem could still dictate which AI assistant ultimately gains traction.

Proponents of the Gemini deal may argue that this is merely an example of product design—similar to Apple selecting its own camera lens supplier. Users don’t choose those suppliers, so why should AI models be any different? This question hinges on how we conceptualize foundation models. If they are merely components, Apple has wide latitude. However, if they function as general-purpose infrastructure akin to search engines, operating systems, or app stores, then control over defaults assumes considerable competitive importance. Given that these models significantly affect information access, creativity, and economic opportunity, the latter perspective is compelling.

Moreover, the deal highlights a more significant issue regarding the functioning of antitrust law in rapidly evolving tech markets. Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, demonstrable evidence of anticompetitive effects is required. Today, the market for foundation models appears dynamic and competitive, featuring players such as ChatGPT, Gemini, and Claude, leaving no clear anticompetitive effects attributable to the Apple–Gemini agreement at this time. However, the moment a single firm controls a critical distribution channel, competition can wither swiftly. Yet, these effects often emerge only after defaults have entrenched themselves, creating an antitrust catch-22: it is challenging to challenge conduct before markets tip, and difficult to rectify them afterward.

The Google search case exemplified this issue. After years of litigation and the establishment of liability, the remedies proved modest and anticlimactic, with Google’s dominance in search remaining largely unchallenged. Now, Google’s built-in advantages are increasingly spilling over into the AI space. The past few years had seen the rise of companies like OpenAI and Anthropic PBC as evidence of a thriving competitive landscape. However, this narrative may have underestimated the advantages held by established players like Google, which brings to Gemini a wealth of publisher data harvested from its search index, ease of integration into search results, a launch platform in Android, and now, distribution channels through Apple.

This partnership also alters Apple’s strategic incentives. If Apple can access a foundation model via Google, will it be incentivized to invest in developing or partnering with a competing model? This dynamic isn't new; previous courts found that Apple's distribution agreement with Google dampened its motivation to develop its own search engine, functioning as a non-aggression pact that insulated both companies from competition.

Having missed out on the initial wave of AI development, Apple may find it simpler to incorporate Google's models than to create its own. While this may represent a rational business decision, it reinforces a familiar pattern where dominant firms bolster their advantages and partition monopoly rewards rather than actively competing.