Wisconsin Lawmakers Are Rethinking Democracy: Could Ranked Choice Voting Change Everything?

As concerns about foreign interference in American elections continue to grow, the Brennan Center for Justice emphasizes that such threats do not warrant presidential intervention in election administration. The U.S. Constitution grants the authority to legislate election rules solely to the states and Congress, leaving the president without a defined role in running elections—even amid claims that national security justifies intervention.

If the federal government genuinely aimed to combat foreign threats to U.S. elections, its strategies would likely differ significantly from current actions. Over the past year, critics argue, the administration has made the nation more susceptible to both foreign influence and interference.

Understanding Foreign Influence and Interference

To navigate this complex landscape, it's crucial to differentiate between *foreign influence* and *foreign interference*. Election interference involves compromising the ability of election administrators and workers to conduct fair elections, while foreign influence encompasses a range of activities designed to sway the opinions of candidates and voters. This distinction became even more pronounced in 2020 when federal agencies began categorizing these activities as separate, with each having distinct warning signs and legal ramifications. The federal government's role primarily focuses on countering national security threats rather than managing elections directly.

Legally, foreign interference is typically prohibited under numerous federal laws, whereas the legality of foreign influence remains ambiguous. For instance, foreign influence may manifest through social media posts aimed at shaping public opinion. During the upcoming 2024 election cycle, the U.S. Intelligence Community observed that “foreign actors... promote influence narratives seeking to undermine democratic institutions, foment discord, and/or change public opinion.” Additionally, these actors often depend on both "witting and unwitting Americans" to amplify their messages.

Under the First Amendment, the government cannot restrict Americans' free speech or access to information, irrespective of its source. However, it can reveal the foreign origins of such information when possible and indict foreign actors for violations of U.S. laws, such as concealing their roles in spreading false narratives or laundering money to evade sanctions.

Legal Accountability and Recent Incidents

Foreign influence operations have not gone unpunished. In 2024, the Justice Department indicted two Russian nationals, Kostiantyn Kalashnikov and Elena Afanasyeva, for laundering money through foreign shell companies to covertly fund a U.S. company, Tenet Media, which generated content aligned with Russian interests. They faced charges for conspiracy to violate the Foreign Agents Registration Act and money laundering. The Treasury Department subsequently sanctioned them for their ties to the Russian government.

Similarly, Iranian cyber actors were implicated in sending stolen materials related to then-candidate Trump’s re-election campaign to U.S. media and individuals connected to the Biden campaign, aiming to sow discord and undermine confidence in democratic institutions. The DOJ took action against those responsible, and sanctions were imposed.

While Chinese actors have yet to face formal charges, the Intelligence Community assessed in 2024 that China sought to influence congressional races without favoring any particular party, likely to safeguard its interests regarding Taiwan. The FBI’s Foreign Influence Task Force initiated investigations, including one involving an overseas police station targeting Chinese Americans in local elections.

The only confirmed case of election interference in recent U.S. history was in 2016 when Russian intelligence agencies infiltrated election board infrastructure. The Department of Homeland Security later concluded that these agencies did not compromise voting tabulation systems. In response, both the Obama and Trump administrations took action against Russian operatives, including the expulsion of intelligence officials and indictments for conspiracy to commit computer fraud and identity theft.

Despite claims of interference by Iran and China during the 2020 elections, the Center for Democracy and Technology found no evidence supporting these allegations. However, instances of influence from these nations were documented. A Senate Judiciary Committee report from July 2025 revealed that China had allegedly acquired fake driver’s licenses for fraudulent ballot casting, though the Intelligence Community maintained that there was no interference in election infrastructure.

The latest assessment for the 2024 elections reiterated that foreign actors remain intent on using influence to undermine U.S. democracy but found no confirmed acts of interference. Following the election, then-CISA Director Jen Easterly echoed positive evaluations regarding the integrity of U.S. election infrastructure, noting no evidence of malicious activity that would materially impact security.

While foreign influence poses significant concerns, it does not justify federal overreach into election management or the seizure of state election infrastructure, as seen in recent FBI actions in Georgia's Fulton County.

Moving Forward: Addressing Foreign Influence and Interference

To effectively combat foreign influence, the federal government must leverage its resources to identify and respond to these activities. However, the second Trump administration dismantled several offices that previously focused on detecting and countering foreign influence, leaving state and local governments to fend for themselves. Restoring critical offices like CISA's Election Security Group and the FBI’s Foreign Influence Task Force is essential for ensuring accountability and transparency in addressing these threats.

For foreign interference, the decentralized nature of the U.S. election system presents challenges. Nevertheless, federal partnerships with state and local governments could enhance their capabilities to identify and recover from foreign cyberattacks on election infrastructure. This support includes providing access to cybersecurity tools, funds to address vulnerabilities, and facilitating information sharing among intelligence agencies, state officials, and private industry.

Post-2016, the federal government established structures to safeguard election infrastructure against physical and cyber threats. In 2017, the Department of Homeland Security designated election infrastructure as critical, granting state and local governments access to essential cybersecurity services. However, significant reductions in funding and resources under the current administration have hindered these efforts, leading to dismay among election officials from both major parties.

While foreign influence and interference present real threats, they are distinct issues that require tailored responses. Federal intervention in election administration is unnecessary and counterproductive. Rather, the focus should be on rebuilding the institutions established to protect democracy, fostering transparency regarding foreign activities, and restoring trust with election officials.

Lawrence Norden is the vice president of the Elections and Government Program at the Brennan Center. Kate Lurie is a consultant with the Brennan Center, formerly the director of election security at the National Security Council.